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The Economics of Software Products: an Example of Market Failure 
Abstract 
In this paper we examine pricing imperfections in software companies by analyzing the 
case of Microsoft, and we uncover the presence of pervasive dead-weight losses derived 
from the inability of the producer to achieve first degree price discrimination. Because 
the nature of software is such that it can be reproduced an infinite number of times at 
practically zero cost once the first copy is manufactured, the amount of these losses in 
terms of efficiency can be substantial, which opens the door for external intervention in 
the market. We then study the case of duopoly and general competitive outcomes, and 
suggest simple policy rules to improve on the behaviour of the market, although the 
applicability may be limited to the theoretical realm, as it requires an omniscient 
regulator, and it can distort the incentives of private enterprise as a provider of software 
products. 
********* 
As has been described by Varian, the production methods of certain types of goods are 
characterized by large fixed costs and comparatively low variable costs, conferring them 
important economies of scale. In these cases, pricing at marginal cost may not recoup all 
the production costs, consequently firms should sometimes engage in differential 
pricing to ensure a socially desirable outcome, and regulations forcing flat pricing may 
end up hurting economic efficiency as a result. 
Some industries, like the telecommunications sector, lend themselves to this task better 
than others do. An unfortunate example of this latter kind is a large segment of the 
software industry, where arbitrage by third parties cannot be easily prevented, and the 
ability of the producer to price discriminate is therefore severely diminished. This 
applies to medium to low priced products with high volumes of sales using the Internet 
or retail shops as distribution channels. It is not applicable however to low volume high 
priced items, typically supported by sales force personnel, where segmentation is indeed 
possible and copyright protection can be adequately enforced. For the rest of this 
document we will dissect the former type of information goods. 
Software as a product is indeed a very interesting economic problem to focus on, 
because the marginal costs of production, or distribution for that matter, are rather 
insignificant, so in a perfect world the supply side should be able to meet nearly all 
potential demand. By demand in this context I mean any customer willing to buy at a 
price that satisfies both his wants and those of the producer, i.e. making a healthy profit 
on each and every sale. 
The peculiarities of software also indicate that maybe it should be a publicly produced 
good, in the sense that it is perhaps better managed by the government than by private 
means. I will try to make a case for placing Microsoft Office in public hands, and find 
out that there is potential for an acquisition where everybody involved wins. 
Let’s imagine for a second that we are in Economic Wonderland, where all sorts of 
miracles happen, rather than in the real world. In this imaginary place, the producer has 
perfect information about the demand curve, and is able to identify how much each and 
every customer is willing to pay for the product it tries to sell, setting the price 
individually for each and every customer willing to buy. It is assumed that our customer 
will always buy if the perceived value received by purchasing the product exceeds the 
price the producer sets, or if the perceived value is equal to said price, it will be 
indifferent about the purchasing choice altogether and just as likely to acquire the 
product or not. 
However, just a quick glance reveals that we don't live in that imaginary world. Many 
wrong economic policies in the past were based on oversimplifications like this one, 
stemming from assumptions coming way back from neoclassical economics. And well, 
no software company in the world can achieve perfect market segmentation, unless they 
tried to auction the product, which is basically impossible for software because it lacks 
the natural scarcity of other auctionable goods, like for example, art pieces or search 
engine advertising space. What's more, because the decision makers of our software 
company have really no idea about the willingness to buy of each individual customer, 
they try to make educated guesses through market research, forecasting based on past 
sales data, etc. 
And perhaps much more importantly, even in the unlikely event that they did manage to 
gather all that information, they could still not achieve perfect market segmentation. 
Why so? Because customers in the real world interact and communicate with each 
other, and they would sooner or later find out that they're being deceived when realizing 
that they paid a certain amount and someone else paid much less for what's essentially 
the same commodity. Potential customers, aware of the whole process, may then defer 
purchases expecting to find a better deal somewhere else, or even decide not to buy at 
all. The brand name of Microsoft would likely be permanently affected in the 
marketplace. 
I briefly searched for a reliable source of information on profit margins of Microsoft 
Office but couldn't find any; the data I found suggests it might be around 70-80%, 
which is sufficiently high for the sake of this argument. As to why it is this high, the 
explanation can be found in vendor lock-in through proprietary formats, and the 
network effects present in the natural exchanges of data in said formats between 
different owners of the product. Once the product achieves critical mass, vendor lock-in 
basically forbids the entrance of new competitors to the network of existing buyers, and 
the network effects present in document exchanges consolidate a monopolistic market 
position. 
Ignoring the recurring support costs and marketing costs of a product based company, 
there is an opportunity to buy it out based on the inability of Microsoft to meet all 
market demand that they really would want to reach to maximize their profit, because as 
we saw before, they cannot discriminate between customers willing to pay 150$ or 
customers willing to pay 200$ for the same product unless they use very complicated 
pricing mechanisms, which won't work in practice. Let's say, Microsoft decides to set its 
price for Microsoft Office at 200$ because their analysis shows it maximizes their 
revenue. Based on their 70-80% profit margin, they would also be willing to sell it at 
150$, 100$, or 75$, if they only could. 
  
  
Figure 1: Consumer surplus gain when pricing at P2 
  
That means that, we could theoretically make a case to buy out the Microsoft Office 
product line and place it in public hands based on the following observation: it is 
actually worth more to the public than to Bill Gates himself, hence there is an 
opportunity for a buy out where all parties involved win. Microsoft's inability to achieve 
perfect price segmentation is no problem at all for the government, which can simply 
charge a token fee to cover the recurring support costs, since the profit margin of 
Microsoft was 70-80%, the government must charge at least 20-30%, let's say price P2 
in figure 1, of the amount that Microsoft charged initially (P1), to cover the operating 
costs. Now, this figure is just a ballpark estimate that may or may not be accurate 
because the increased demand satisfied by the government charging lower prices will 
certainly increase support costs, but perhaps not in a linear fashion, and because 
software scales rather nicely with volume, it may be actually lower in the end. 
Furthermore, we also have to consider that buying out the market leader may also push 
other producers out of the market, and this may have other positive economic benefits in 
the sense that production of inferior substitute goods is actively discouraged. Given the 
nearly zero marginal costs of producing and distributing a software product, this is 
really a good thing, because the demand for Microsoft Office will increase and the costs 
will drop as a result of these rather peculiar properties, namely that software scales with 
volume. The consumer surplus from going from price P1 to P2 is increased, meaning 
that the difference between what the customer pays and the received perceived value is 
higher. 
By how much, you ask? By the area marked in figure 1. The area in red is extra benefit 
accrued to the customers now that was not reachable in the previous scenario, because 
Microsoft was unable to capture it either. Conversely, the area marked in blue in the 
diagram is value that has switched hands from the producer to the consumer. This is 
value that Microsoft was capturing before but it has been displaced now with the change 
in pricing.  
So how exactly did this happen? We saw before that Microsoft is very unlikely to ever 
achieve perfect pricing on its own, so if Microsoft calls the price, it will leave out of the 
market customers that would have otherwise bought. As it stands, it is far less costly to 
broadcast the price to all potential customers than to get into your prospects' brains to 
know how much they are really willing to pay. I would even suggest that the second 
option is impossible, but I cannot foresee all the technological advancements that 
science may offer us within some years. 
An economist would say that the transaction costs for both options are asymmetrical. It 
is precisely this asymmetry that allows the customers to self-select themselves and 
reach a more efficient outcome in the second scenario than in the first one. In theory, it 
is possible that all present and future interested buyers, right up to the end of the product 
life cycle, those that can be reached by Microsoft right now as well as those that have 
and will be left out of the market because of imperfections in pricing, could get together 
and buy out the whole Microsoft Office product line and share it among themselves, as 
they can relinquish part of their extra consumer surplus and hand it to the producer. 
On the one hand, the producer will gladly accept the arrangement as this increases the 
amount of profit that it would otherwise be able to capture. And on the other hand, the 
consumers as a group win as long as they retain part of their newly attained consumer 
surplus during the negotiation. 
As interesting as it may be, this scenario won't ever happen in practice, because while 
the consumers as a group may win, they are likely to try to misrepresent their real 
intentions of buying to each other, resulting into what is known as the free rider 
problem. They have incentives to state that they are only willing to pay up to an amount 
when they would be really willing to go higher. This occurs because consumers 
compete with each other just as much as producers do to acquire goods or services in 
the economy, so they may be very tempted to take such a course of action when given 
the chance. 
Let us analyze now this point more closely. In figure 2 we see the matrix of expected 
payments for all possible strategies that can be followed when agreeing on the purchase. 
We say that a potential client collaborates with the rest if he reveals his real intentions 
of buying to the group, making a deposit into a common fund for the lowest amount 
between P1 and the maximum sum of money he is willing to spend when acquiring the 
product. If every member were to be completely honest, they could compute the 
revenue obtained by Microsoft in the original situation, i.e. the sum of the contributions 
of the individuals with willingness to pay of at least P1. In this scenario they would 
make an offer to Microsoft slightly above this value and the extra consumer surplus that 
they obtain they share it among themselves (the remaining sum of money in the fund 
after the purchase), let us say, in equal slices (X). 
 
Group \ Individual Collaborates Does not collaborate 
Rest collaborates X X + Y 
Rest does not collaborate 0 0 
Figure 2: Matrix of payments for the individual strategies when faced with the purchase 
 
It is to be expected that some potential clients will lie about their willingness to pay. If 
they are only but a few and the rest of the group collaborates, they would be able to 
retain for themselves an extra value Y resulting from the difference between the 
maximum price they would be willing to pay and the one they revealed to the group. As 
we said that they were just a few, the distributed consumer surplus (X) decreases though 
not much, and the difference we can consider as negligible. 
However, if many of them act dishonestly, the estimate derived when adding up the 
contributions from the members with willingness to pay of at least P1 will be incorrect, 
and the deal may finally fall through, as Microsoft will reject it because the offered 
quantity is insufficient to their eyes. Each individual has an incentive to lie and thus 
obtain more benefit than the rest from the arrangement, but if enough individuals act 
that way, nobody gains anything. If we observe the matrix of payments we can see that 
not collaborating is a dominant strategy for every individual, because the expected value 
of said strategy is at least as good as collaborating, with the potential of being better if 
the rest of the group collaborates but the individual in question does not. We say in this 
case that we face a Nash equilibrium and the agreement will not be reached in the end. 
So perhaps the government should buy out the Microsoft Office product line, and price 
on cost to maximize welfare. In any case, carrying out a detailed cost-benefit analysis 
for such a project would be excruciating, as collecting revenue through taxation imposes 
burdens of its own in the economy and their effects are difficult to quantify. In addition, 
the government would be subsidizing future Microsoft Office customers at the expense 
of other citizens in its country, so this alternative is to be discouraged. The people that 
benefit from buying out Microsoft Office should foot the bill for themselves, but as we 
already said, they probably can’t because they are in direct competition for other goods 
and services in the economy. 
Hold on a second, didn't we just discover a rather serious market inefficiency? This is a 
theoretical win-win proposition for everybody involved that would lead to what an 
economist would call a Pareto efficient outcome, but it's just not taking place. I guess 
this can only indicate that markets are at least a bit more inefficient than some may 
think.  
Economic efficiency is maximized if any of the goals below is achieved… 
-         The producer is able to perfectly segment the market and price accordingly (the 
producer surplus is maximized). 
-         The price covers just the costs and the profit is zero (the consumer surplus is 
maximized). 
-         The producer manages to always price below the maximum price a consumer is 
willing to stand (then neither of them is maximized). We will focus on the first 
two cases and I’ll leave it as an exercise to the reader to find out why we 
shouldn’t care at all about this third case. 
Competition between consumers helps to achieve the first goal (producer surplus 
maximization), but as we saw before, it is practically impossible to reach this outcome 
in the real world, so we can immediately rule it out as a viable path to efficiency, 
because when the producer calls the price, due to the high transaction costs to reach the 
prospects, it will necessarily leave out some potential customers that may have 
otherwise bought. 
On the contrary, competition between producers helps to achieve the second goal 
(consumer surplus maximization), and this has far more interesting implications. First of 
all, no producer is willing to take up an investment just to break even. Hence, reaching 
this second outcome perfectly within a competitive framework is also impossible. And 
secondly, a modest amount of profit may not be worthwhile if the capital needed can be 
put to work elsewhere for a higher return on investment. 
But what this whole thing really means is that high profit margins should really be 
actively suppressed whenever possible by regulators, ensuring that competition between 
producers brings the producer surplus down to reasonable levels, and at the same time 
increasing the consumer surplus and helping the formerly unmet demand to enter the 
market. 
A profit maximizing firm is unlikely to pursue this on its own as it conflicts with its 
inherent interests, so Adam Smith’s invisible hand may perhaps need a little bit of help 
from time to time to reach a more efficient outcome. 
Let’s go back to Microsoft Office... Antimonopoly laws may be passed on whenever a 
market exhibits characteristics conductive to a permanent market advantage resulting in 
an ever lasting monopoly. For Microsoft Office, these are vendor lock-in and network 
effects as mentioned before. A possible path of action to improve economic efficiency is 
to force Microsoft to open all their proprietary formats so that other competitors can 
enter the market and thus erode profit margins. 
As far as the new competitors improve efficiency through lower prices more than they 
raise total cost, competition is a desirable, albeit an imperfect way to remedy the 
situation. Typically the existing group of sellers will lower prices until they face 
inelastic demand whereby their revenue cannot be increased by further lowering their 
price, until the high profit margins alert other entrepreneurs and they enter the specific 
business niche, thus eroding those same margins in their quest for market share. 
And given that software as a product is self-induced scarcity in the land of plenty, in an 
even more radical attempt to improve efficiency, we could envision the government 
taking full control of Microsoft Office by effectively expropriating the software at 
production costs, and to avoid the subsidy problem, taking out a loan to finance the 
purchase. Microsoft’s shareholders would obviously be made worse off since they 
wouldn’t receive the dividends coming from the profit stream, but if the government 
decided to price at a level just enough to repay the loan and cover ongoing support 
costs, everybody else would be better off. 
Some may object that private property is a universal right and oppose such a measure 
from an ethical standpoint, but I might as well argue that Bill Gates is rich enough 
already and he shouldn't mind that much. From an economic point of view, this policy 
would result in a more efficient result than the present state of being, except for the fact 
that software piracy already achieves more or less the desired effect without the need for 
intervention. 
What do we mean by that? Many economic policies are shoved down the throats of 
innocent souls based on what is known as the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion. This 
basically means that, given two possible resource allocation choices leading to two 
different outcomes, we can evaluate which is better by looking at the global picture 
rather than at each and every individual affected. Some people may win, some people 
may lose, others may be indifferent about the whole thing, but as long as the winners 
gain more than the losers lose, they might somehow manage to compensate them for 
their loss. 
Well, here's the news, attacking the private property rights of Microsoft in this manner 
is also Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Thus pure laissez faire economics is wrong, or so we 
may be inclined to think. Of course, Microsoft Office would never come into being in 
the first place if the incentives to its production were to be removed completely, which 
leads us to ponder if software should be publicly produced instead, or at least part of it. 
As a consequence, the selective impulse and adoption of open source initiatives by the 
administration is not too farfetched, as this reduces the extent of the efficiency losses 
coming from the private sector. 
Nonetheless, since I hear Hayek screaming from his grave, we need not be this 
revolutionary after all. Microsoft enjoys a monopolistic position although at the same 
time it faces fierce competition, not from the outside, but from its very own 
headquarters in Seattle. The nature of its business model is such that it receives a lump 
sum for each copy of Microsoft Office it sells, but in order to generate additional 
revenue, it is being forced to either reach new customers all the time, or given that 
software does not wear out like other goods, to improve its product offering so as to 
compel existing customers to buy a fresh license again of its refurbished releases. The 
existence of this second constraint pushes Microsoft to remain competitive even in the 
absence of external pressure. 
However, it tries to escape from this loop by striking distribution agreements with 
hardware providers, bundling its new operating systems and software when a consumer 
acquires a notebook or a PC, as hardware does wear out and gets obsolete in a few 
years, inducing its customer base to upgrade to the new Microsoft software even if they 
hadn’t considered the possibility on their own. This practice should perhaps demand 
further attention from antitrust regulators as it tends to hinder competition in the 
software industry, although given that one firm can supply the whole market and new 
entrants won’t increase total output, competition might not be a desirable trait if it raises 
total industry costs faster than it reduces the losses in efficiency coming from 
imperfections in pricing. 
In the world of physical goods, the entrance of competitors translates directly into a 
global increase of supply, but for the case of software products this premise does not 
hold true, because the supply of each individual vendor is potentially infinite, as 
software is a non-rival good. What’s more, every vendor replicates a core set of features 
available across all products in order to reach a marketable state, and this can be 
regarded as a waste of productive resources. Copying the functionality of a product of 
the complexity of Microsoft Office can easily range in the order of millions of dollars. 
OpenOffice, an open source alternative, has entered the scene by reverse engineering 
Microsoft’s file formats, but in order to do so it has also paid dearly in development 
costs. 
Just so you get a glimpse of how bad the situation really is, let’s leave Microsoft Office 
and its insurmountable barriers to entry aside, to focus on markets that don’t offer that 
shield of protection against competition. Take for example the antivirus, backup, and 
CD replication utilities. These are horizontal solutions, therefore the size of their 
respective markets is huge, and there are no network effects here that prevent the 
entrance of new vendors. As a result, the fields are fairly competitive. 
A quick search in one of the most popular software download sites in the Internet yields 
the following results: 
 
Keyword Results 
antivirus 272 hits 
cd burner 59 hits 
backup 149 hits 
Figure 3: Products found per key phrase 
 
Each of these products solves a group of tasks in certain ways, some of these solutions 
are common among all the remaining products, and some of them are unique to each 
product and come as a result of innovation on the part of their creators, giving them a 
relative advantage over the products that lack them. If there is any proven market value 
in these differentiating features, the rest of the pack rapidly reacts by copying them and 
adding them to their respective products. In doing so, they also incur in most of the 
R&D costs of the innovator, and after a while the features no longer bring a competitive 
advantage. 
Some countries, although not all, protect innovation by granting patents on software 
artifacts, but these are often difficult to enforce in court and they can easily be 
circumvented through minor variations if the scope of the patent is not ample enough. 
Shall an antivirus firm find a better way to serve the needs of its customers, the 271 
remaining competitors will eventually follow suit and replicate the winning 
combination in their own products. Rather than having it developed once, it will be 
developed again and again. If instead of competing between them, all the workers from 
all antivirus firms decided to collaborate to create only one antivirus product, the 
surplus workers could be deviated towards other productive occupations in the benefit 
of the economy as a whole. Unlike in other fields of human endeavour, competition 
breeds inefficiency in the software industry. However, as we will explain later, a Pareto 
improvement is possible. 
Let us have a closer look. First we will consider vendor A alone in the marketplace, 
which faces the demand curve for the whole market. Because most of the cost is 
concentrated in the first few units, partially through fixed costs and partially through 
variable costs incurred when producing the first unit, the average cost curve can be 
regarded as a monotonically decreasing function, like the one shown in figure 4. This 
has a few interesting implications, that we proceed to unravel.  
 Figure 4: Average cost of software as a function of produced units 
 
Now we take into account the effect of introducing competitor B with an identical 
product to that of our initial vendor. Figure 5 shows a joint demand curve, which is the 
quantity demanded at each pricing point provided that both products have the same 
price and move in unison. For every price, the joint demand is exactly half of that of the 
market demand, because both producers share the total revenue equally. This is a useful 
mental construct because whichever equilibrium point the market reaches, it must 
necessarily fall within this line, as states where both products have different prices 
cannot be regarded as stable. 
 
 
Figure 5: Joint demand curve vs. market demand curve 
 
If the product from vendor A is priced below product from vendor B it will serve the 
whole market, and vendor B has an incentive to lower its pricing point and set it to the 
same price as product A, or lower, where A will be tempted to repeat the process or risk 
losing all customers. However, profit of both firms is maximized if they set their price 
at the level of unit demand elasticity, and although strictly speaking this is not a Nash 
equilibrium as both firms have an incentive to lower their price to gain the whole 
market, fear of retaliation is likely to leave the price unaltered and a tacit agreement is 
reached whereby the price remains above what a competitive outcome might suggest, 
i.e. where the profit is zero. 
Notice that when both vendors share a piece of the market, the pricing point that makes 
the profit equal zero is higher than when one vendor is alone in the market. This 
happens because of the decreasing nature of the average cost function, and it means that 
given a market of limited size, software is a natural monopoly, that is, a firm can obtain 
above normal profits during a sustained period of time. A firm alone in the market is 
guaranteed to obtain profits if it sets its price in the range shown in figure 6, delimited 
by p1 and p2. 
 
Figure 6: The market of software as a natural monopoly 
The proof for this concept is simple. At p1 in the monopoly case we know that revenue 
equals cost and profit is zero. This means that average cost times quantity produced Q is 
price times quantity, or in other words, in order to satisfy the condition price must be 
the same as average cost (p1=AC1). When we introduce a competitor, at p1 the demand 
is Q/2 and the average cost AC2 is therefore higher, because the cost function is always 
decreasing and we have reduced the number of produced units. In this scenario, unless 
we raise the price, both firms incur in losses (AC2 > AC1, AC1 = p1 therefore AC2 > 
p1), so p2 must necessarily be higher than p1 or it may also be nonexistent if the market 
is already saturated. 
We can also conceive that because a product with features A+B+C, where arbitrage 
cannot be avoided, has only one pricing point, there is a market opportunity for other 
firm to introduce a product that has just features B+C or C+D or any other combination 
whatsoever that serves a business purpose. That said, it will never pay off for a profit 
maximizing firm to introduce a product with functionality A+B+C if the original vendor 
sets the price within the price point specified in the range as it will result in losses for 
the company. 
Shall the competitor still join the market, two scenarios can take place: either one of the 
companies goes bankrupt and we return to the monopoly setting, or both firms 
collaborate to raise their prices collectively at least to the point p2 where they do not 
incur in losses. And if they are to collaborate, they might as well raise the price to the 
point of unit elasticity, where profit reaches a maximum. This process can continue with 
three firms, four or more in the marketplace. But as new firms are added to the mix, 
collaboration between them is increasingly unlikely, because the incentives to compete 
and gain market share at the expense of the other participants are higher. 
In practice, we have observed before that software markets without substantial barriers 
to entry have plenty of competition. Since a product typically has a limited lifespan, 
firms may decide to set its price above the range we mentioned if they obtain enough 
profits overall to offset the future losses of profit attained by attracting new entrants 
later on. 
This fact, coupled with imperfect information on the side of the consumer, whereby he 
may be aware of only a limited set of products when deciding to purchase one of them, 
explains that there are 272 antivirus products in the market instead of just one. This has 
rather tragic consequences from an efficiency consideration, but we can theoretically 
improve on this outcome. Total industry cost increases linearly with each new entrant, 
which opens up the following possibility: an external benevolent regulator could 
theoretically buy ALL companies in the marketplace above the market price, i.e. 
considering their present and future profit stream, and arrive at a nearly Pareto 
improvement in overall efficiency. 
It is quite logical that there is nothing we can do about sunk costs that the industry has 
incurred in producing the available array of products in the market, but we can improve 
the outcome if we reduce future costs that are about to take place. An observation must 
be made: for the particular case of software, any market equilibrium is not a Nash 
equilibrium in itself, as a firm has an incentive to add additional functionality to its 
existing product and earn above normal profits. As we said before, the competitors will 
copy said functionality if it has market value, which they will immediately feel in the 
form of a loss in market share if they remain oblivious to it without doing anything 
about it. 
Suppose we are a governmental entity and we can estimate the profit earned by each 
company in the antivirus marketplace during the whole product lifecycle, for example, 
ten years. If we offer 5% over that amount to the shareholders for their respective 
products and they act rationally, meaning that they attempt to maximize their profit, 
they will accept the offer. How do we recover this money? First of all, we can continue 
selling the products at the current market price and earn all but the 5% we overpaid for. 
But we can improve on this outcome if we consider the savings in development costs.  
For the particular case of software, R&D cost pales in comparison with the cost of 
implementing and testing to deliver a real product. We could continue developing the 
leading product in the market and discontinue development for everything else 
altogether. Imagine development costs eat up 60% of the revenue for a given product. If 
we fire all the developers except for those of one company and give them 2 years salary 
as severance package for doing nothing (that they can use to retrain themselves for a 
different occupation where they will actually do something productive), we would be 
saving 47.8% of total industry costs, that can pay for the additional 5% in profit and 
then some more. We cannot ascertain for sure that this is a Pareto improvement because 
it is not clear if the developers will find a better job or not, but we give them a fair 
chance of doing so, enough to consider that perhaps they will. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we presented an overview of the economic principles that apply in the 
software industry. While it is widely accepted since a long time ago that a non 
discriminating monopoly results in non-efficient outcomes, the effect of competition in 
the software industry from the point of view of efficiency has been largely overlooked. 
Software products always result in inefficiencies either through the market power of a 
few players or through the wasted productivity of many small parties. 
In the light of these findings, it would be tempting to conclude that the government 
must necessarily step in to improve the situation, but an indiscriminate attack on the 
private sector would likely stifle innovation and slow economic progress. Caution must 
then be exercised in extracting any normative implication out of this knowledge. 
 
References: 
Differential Pricing and Efficiency, Varian H. 1996 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/473/394 
